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1. Introduction 
There is renewed interest in the economic impact of immigration in Britain, prompted by a rise in 
the share of foreign-born individuals in the working age population over the last ten years. In 
2005, 11.5% of the working age population had been born overseas, up from the 8.5% share 
observed at the end of the last recession in 1993 and the 7% share observed in the mid-seventies, 
(see Figure 1 for the evolution of the immigrant share over the period 1975-2005). The addition 
to the UK population over this period caused by the rise in the number of working age 
immigrants from 2.3 to 4.1 million, is about the same as that stemming from the increase in the 
native-born working age population caused by the baby boom generation reaching adulthood (up 
from 29.5 to 31.3 million).  
The impact of immigration on labour market outcomes is a controversial issue among 
both economists and the general public. The largest body of evidence comes from the United 
States where different researchers have come to different conclusions about its effects. Card 
(1990, 2001, 2005) finds little discernible impact of immigration on native wages, while Borjas et 
al. (1996), Borjas (1999, 2003) argue that immigration has had a pronounced effect on the native 
wage structure.  
However, British evidence on the impact of immigration is rather scarce and one should 
not automatically assume that the impact of immigration in Britain will be similar to that in the 
U.S.1 One notable recent UK study by Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) uses variation in the 
composition of immigrants relative to natives by skill and region and concludes that immigration 
has no discernible effect on the level of native wages. However there is a puzzle here. The 
conclusion that shocks to the supplies of different sorts of labour have no effect on wages is not 
easy to reconcile with the findings of Card and Lemieux (2001) who find that the return to 
education in Britain is sensitive to the supply of educated relative to less educated workers. If 
                                                 
1 For example, as shown below, immigrants to Britain are, on average, better educated than native-born, something 
that is not true in the U.S. (see for example Schmitt and Wadsworth 2006). 
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changes in immigration affect relative supplies this would seem to imply that immigration must 
have an effect on labour market outcomes of native-born workers. 
In this paper we offer a resolution of this apparent paradox. Starting from the multi-level 
CES production function approach used by Card and Lemieux (2001) to assess the contribution 
of changes in the supply and demand for skills on the wage structure, we extend the approach by 
allowing for the possibility that native and immigrant workers are perfect substitutes in 
production, an approach also taken by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the U.S.2  
Like Ottaviano and Peri (2006) we find evidence that natives and immigrants are 
imperfect substitutes within age-education groups so that the native-immigrant wage differential 
is sensitive to the share of immigrants in the working age population. A 10% rise in the 
population share of immigrants is estimated to increase the native-migrant wage differential by 
around 2%. However, the impact of increased immigration on native wages is muted by the low 
substitutability between immigrants and natives. Our estimates suggest that the only sizeable 
effect of increased immigration is on the wages of those immigrants who are already here. It is 
thus not surprising that Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) fail to find any effects of 
immigration on the wages of natives. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model of wage 
determination underlying our empirical approach. Section 3 highlights the empirical strategy 
based on this theoretical model and discusses identification and specification issues. Section 4 
discusses the data used to produce the estimates and Section 5 reports the results of the regression 
analysis. Section 6 presents some simple simulations of the effects of immigration on the wage 
distribution based on our results and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Others (Grossman (1982), Chiswick et al. (1985), Borjas (1987)) have explicitly attempted to identify the elasticity 
of substitution between immigrant and native workers but differently from us these papers treat workers with 
different skills as perfect substitutes. Lalonde and Topel (1991), is an exception that looks at the extent of 
substitutability within the stock of immigrants. 
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2.  Theoretical Framework 
Consider a stylised model of labour demand, disaggregated by skill, age, similar to Card and 
Lemieux's (2001) model of changes in the returns to education and the ‘structural’ model in the 
second part of Borjas (2003). Unlike Card and Lemieux and Borjas, but similar to Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006) we treat immigrant and native workers as two different production inputs that may 
not be perfect substitutes and then estimate the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs 
from the data. We assume that the production function is of a nested CES form. Firms produce 
output using a combination of skilled and unskilled labour according to the production function:3  
1
1 2t t t t tY A L L
ρ ρ ρθ⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦      (1) 
where 1 is skilled labour, 2 is unskilled labour and , 1,2etL e =  denotes the aggregate labour input 
for workers skill e at time t. At is a skill-neutral technology parameter, tθ  is the efficiency of 
skilled relative to unskilled labour so that any rise in tθ  represents skill-biased technical change, 
(SBTC). The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is σE=1/(1-ρ).  
We model each of the skill-specific labour inputs as a CES combination of a set of 
(potentially) imperfectly substitutable age-specific labour inputs according to: 
( )( )1/ , 1, 2et ea eataL L eηηα= =∑     (2) 
where the index a denotes a specific age group (a = 1,2,.. A) and the elasticity of substitution 
between different age groups, σA=1/(1-η), is a parameter to be estimated but assumed to be skill 
invariant. The αea 's are measures of the relative efficiency of different age inputs for each 
education group. We follow Card and Lemieux in assuming that there is no age-biased technical 
change so that the α do not vary over time. Any time effects are therefore subsumed in ( ),t tA θ  at 
                                                 
3 This can be thought of either as a long-run production function in which capital is endogenous or as a short-run 
production function in which Y is a composite labour input.  As we only ever estimate models for relative wages, the 
discussion is not affected by the interpretation preferred.   
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the top level of aggregation. Furthermore, we impose the normalisation that αe1=1. The 
normalization is innocuous as it can be thought of as defining the units of measurement of Let.   
So far, this model is identical to Card and Lemieux (2001). As an addition to their model 
and similar to Ottaviano and Peri (2006) we also assume that each age-education specific labour 
input is a CES combination of native born and immigrant workers:  
 ( )( )1/eat eat eat eatL N M δδ δβ= +  (3) 
where N is native-born, M is immigrant and β is the native-immigrant relative efficiency 
parameter. The coefficient on N in (3) is again restricted to be equal to one without loss of 
generality. Equation (3) therefore allows the relative efficiency parameters on the native and 
immigrant workers – the βeat - to vary by skill, age and time. This implies that wages of native- 
born relative to immigrants can vary over time even at fixed levels of demand and supply. This 
can happen because of changes in discrimination, changes in the “quality” of the immigration 
stock caused by either between or within-country of origin changes across cohorts, selective 
immigration or out-migration over the life cycle as well as changing costs of assimilation.  
From (3), the elasticity of substitution between immigrant and native workers is given by 
σI=1/(1-δ). If δ≠1 immigrants and natives are not perfect substitutes and then immigration, or any 
change in the relative supply of these two groups, will change the native-migrant wage 
differential. By equating immigrant and native-born wages to the appropriate marginal products 
of labour, using (1) to (3) we can derive an expression for the wages of natives and immigrants in 
each education-age-time cell: 
1 1 1 1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln lns seat t t et ea eat et eat eat
E A E I A I
W A Y L L Sθ α βσ σ σ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + + + + − + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 (4) 
where S is immigrant status (Natives or immigrants; S=N, M) and 1Neatβ = , Meat eatβ β= . From (4) 
we can derive the native-migrant wage differential in each age-education-time cell as: 
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 1ln ln ln
N
eat eat
eatM
eat I eat
W N
W M
β σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (5) 
This shows that - net of changes in productivity proxied by the βeat terms – wages of native born 
relative to immigrant workers in each age-education cell depend inversely on their relative 
supply. 
We can also use (4) to obtain the relative returns to education by age, time and immigrant 
status. The skilled to unskilled relative wage for age group a at time t in nativity group S is given 
by:  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
S S
at a at t at t at at
tS S
at a at E t A at t I at at
W L L L S L
W L L L S L
α βθ α β σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + − − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
     (6) 
This simply shows that returns to education by age for each nativity group S depend on some 
measure of changes in demand for skills [lnθt+ ln(α1a/α2a)+ ln(βS1at/βS2at)], the aggregate relative 
supply by education ln(L1t/L2t), the deviation in the supply of each age group relative to the 
overall supply [ln(L1at/L2at)- ln(L1t/L2t)] and the relative contribution of that nativity group to the 
age-skill supply [ln(S1at/S2at)-ln(L1at/L2at)].4 Equations (4) and (6) are the basis for our empirical 
work. 
 
3. Estimation and Identification 
The difficulty with estimating (6) directly is that in order to obtain an estimate of σA one needs to 
have estimated Leat first. To do so equation (3) tells us that we need an estimate of all the βeat 's 
and σI. Similarly in order to obtain an estimate of σE we need an estimate of Let and to do so 
equation (2) tells us that we need estimates of the αea's and σA. We therefore proceed iteratively. 
Consider the first stage of this process. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Note that for σI→∞, equation (6) is the one estimated by Card and Lemieux (2001). 
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Step 1. Estimating σI and βeat 
Using (5) we constrain ln(βeat) to vary additively by skill, time and age for each nativity group S 
so that: 
 ln eat e a tf f fβ− = + +  (7) 
Given this we can obtain an estimate of σΙ  from (4) based on estimation of the following model:  
 1ln ln
N
eat eat
e a tM
eat I eat
W Nf f f
W Mσ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (8) 
Hence, we regress the log relative wage of native to immigrant workers for each age-education-
time cell on the relative supply for each cell alongside skill, age and time dummies. The 
coefficient on the cell-specific relative supply of graduates gives us an estimate of the elasticity 
of substitution between immigrants and natives. The coefficients on the additive education, age 
and time dummies provide an estimate of eatβ . We can then use these estimates to compute Leat 
from (3). 
Step 2: Estimating σA and αea 
Given these estimates we use (6) to estimate the relative returns to education for native born and 
immigrants. Given our assumptions, this differential equals: 
 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1ln ln ln ln
S
at at at at
a t SS
at A at I at at
W L S Ld d d
W L S Lσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (9) 
where the time dummies, dt, capture all the time-invariant part of (6), the age dummies, da, 
capture the relative age-effects on productivity, i.e. ln(α1a/α2a) and the immigrant dummy 
variable, dS, captures the effect of ln(βS1at/βS2at). The coefficient on the cell-specific relative 
supply of graduates to high school workers gives an estimate of the elasticity of substitution 
across age groups, σA. Note, that estimation of (9) also provides a new estimate of σI and hence 
an implicit test of the specification of the model. One can then recover estimates of the ln(αea) 
based on (4) since: 
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 1 1ln ln ln ln lnseat et ea eat eat eat I eat
A I
W d d L S L σ βσ σ ⎡ ⎤= + − − − +⎣ ⎦  (10) 
The coefficients on the estimated dea dummies enable us to recover the α parameters and hence 
one can compute Let using (2). 
Step 3: Estimating σΕ  and θt 
We then re-run equation (6) using the computed labour supply terms, assuming (as in Card and 
Lemieux, 2001) that the skill biased technical change term, ln(θt), varies linearly with time i.e. we 
estimate: 
 1 1 1 1 1 20 1
2 2 2 2 1 2
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln
s
at t at t at at
a ss
at E t A at t I at at
W L L L S St d d
W L L L L L
κ κ σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + + − − − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
(11) 
Equation (11) provides an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between the two skills groups 
(σΕ), skilled biased technological change (κ1) as well as new estimates of the σI and σA.  
 
4.  Data 
In this section we give an overview of the data used for estimating the model described in the 
previous two sections. We use information contained in the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
General Household Survey (GHS) for the period from the mid 1970s to the mid 2000s. Both 
surveys contain some information on individual wages and employment status along with data on 
whether the individual was born abroad. The GHS also contains information on country of birth 
and, if born abroad, year of arrival into Britain.5  
The LFS is the larger sample - from around 100,000 observations in the early years to 
around 320,000 observations from 1992 onwards. However, data on wages are only available 
from 1993. In contrast, the annual GHS has sample sizes that are generally one-tenth of the size, 
but does have the advantage of containing information on country of birth and wages since 1973. 
Since the aim of this paper is to assess the effect of exogenous changes in the supply of 
                                                 
5 This information is also available in the LFS but only from 1983 onwards. 
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immigrants on the wage structure, we are interested in obtaining a measure of immigrant labour 
supply that is as free as possible of measurement error that would otherwise tend to attenuate the 
estimated impact of migration on the wage structure. For this reason and in order to have as long 
a sample period as possible, we use GHS data to estimate wages by cells based on age, education, 
immigrant status and time, and the LFS to estimate the corresponding population and 
employment structure for the same cells.6 
The sample used for estimation is men aged 26-60. In our main estimates, we define as an 
immigrant someone who was born outside the United Kingdom, irrespective of the time of or age 
on arrival though we do also report results in which those who came to the UK as young children 
are grouped with the native-born. To measure labour supply we use population rather than 
employment or hours, since non-employment in non trivial among some groups and this could 
itself be an effect of immigration.7  We test the robustness of our results to alternative measures 
of labour supply (employment and hours) in the regressions that follow. 8 
The definition of education groups also deserves discussion. In analysis of UK data it is 
standard practice to define education by the highest level of qualifications obtained. However, 
this is not possible when considering migrants as, in both the GHS and LFS, foreign 
qualifications are classified in the ‘other’ category. For a native-born worker a response that their 
highest qualification is in the ‘other’ category almost certainly means a very low level of 
education, as all the major UK educational qualifications are covered by the alternative possible 
responses. But, as discussed in the Data Appendix, there is good reason to believe that many of 
the immigrants in the ‘other’ category actually have quite high levels of qualifications.  
                                                 
6 A similar procedure is used for example by Arellano and Meghir (1992). 
7 Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) document pronounced differences in employment between (non-white) immigrants 
and native born individuals. One explanation is that this might be due to language difficulties (on this see also 
Dustmann and Fabbri (2003)). 
8 Using employment as opposed to population means that the estimated coefficients will be a mix of the elasticities of 
substitution at different levels and the elasticity of labour supply (see for example Card (2001)). If one is willing to 
assume (as implicit in Card and Lemieux (2001)) that labour supply is completely inelastic, then the estimated 
coefficients should be unchanged if one uses employment or population as a measure of labour supply. 
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Consequently, we use ‘age left full-time education’ as the basis for our classification of 
education. As in Card and Lemieux (2001) but unlike Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri 
(2006) we use two education groups defining anyone who left full time education between the 
age of 17 and 20 as a “High School graduate" and anyone who left education at age 21 or later as 
a "University" graduate.9 As in Card and Lemieux (2001) we give high school dropouts (those 
who left education before the age of 17) a lower weight in computing supplies of High School 
graduates to reflect the fact that they have lower wages than High School graduates. 
In order to keep the analysis as consistent as possible with Card and Lemieux (2001), we 
group individuals into five year and five year-age cells. The mid-points of the time intervals are 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. So the 1980 time cell, for example, contains 
sample observations from 1978 to 1982. Similarly the mid-points of the age intervals are 28, 33, 
38, 43, 48, 53, and 58. So the age 28 group in 1980, for example, contains those aged between 26 
and 30 in the mid-point year, that is, all those born from 1950 to 1954. As the data are pooled 
across five contiguous years, the age group 28 in 1980 also contains all those born between 1950 
and 1954 in the surrounding survey years - 24-28 year olds in 1978, 25-29 year olds in 1979, 27-
31 year olds in 1981 and 28-32 year olds in 1982. In total, we have 196 cells (7 years by 7 age 
groups by 2 education groups by 2 immigrant status groups).  
The data appendix gives more detailed information on the sample selection rules used, the 
definition of variables, and the procedure used to compute returns to education, native-migrant 
wage gaps and labour supply in terms of education equivalents. The appendix also describes in 
detail how we construct cells that aggregate individuals from contiguous years into larger age and 
time cells. 
                                                 
9 There is a substantive issue here regarding the number of groups used.  Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri 
(2006) use four education groups for the U.S. and constrain the elasticity of substitution between any two education 
groups to be the same. However Card and Lemieux (2001) and Card (2005) show that High School graduates and 
High School dropouts are close substitutes, something that is not true of College graduates relative to high School 
graduates – their use of two groups with a composite measure of labour supply for the High School graduates reflects 
this.  
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Table 1 provides a summary of the data over our sample period, while Tables 2-4 present 
more detailed statistics. The first panel of Table 1 shows the increase in the share of immigrants 
in the male sample population over time, up from 8.1% in 1975 to 11.9% in 2005. Most of this 
increase has occurred since 1995 as can also be seen from Figure 1. Table 1 and Figure 1 also 
show that both the level of and the increase in, immigration shares are higher among university 
graduates.10 The share of immigrants among college graduates increases from 12.8% to 20.1% 
with a steady growth through the period. Among those with less than university education the 
immigrant share rises from 7.8% to 9.3% over the same period with almost all of the increase 
concentrated in recent years.  
The second panel shows a secular increase in the education of native born workers. From 
1975 to 2005 the percentage of the native working age population that are university graduates 
rose from 6% to 21.6%.  The subsequent row also shows a rising share of university graduates 
among immigrants – from 9.9% to 40.4%.  
The third panel shows the evolution of the native-migrant wage differential, based on the 
coefficient on a native-born dummy from a regression of log weekly wage conditioning on a 
quadratic in age and a dummy variable for London. This differential does not show a marked 
trend for graduates. For high school workers, the native wage premium appears to have fallen 
over time. The final panel of Table 1 shows a measure of the return to university education for 
immigrants and natives again conditional on a quadratic in age and a London dummy. These 
regressions only include those with a university degree or a high school education (as defined 
above) There is a strong rise in the relative returns to university education for both natives and 
immigrants over the last twenty years of the sample period. The overall rise in returns to 
education in Britain since the 1970s is well known, (see for example Machin, 2003). Perhaps less 
                                                 
10 This is different from the U.S. and can be largely explained by the changes in UK immigration policy over the 
period – for more discussions of this see Bell (1997), Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) and Schmitt and Wadsworth 
(2006).   
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well documented is the fact that both the level of returns to education as well as the change in 
returns is higher for immigrants.  
 Table 2 contains information on the ratio of immigrant to native-born in each age-year 
cell for the two education groups. For skilled individuals, this ratio varies between approximately 
10% and 30%, with an average value of about 20%. At any given age the share of immigrant to 
native-born graduates rises with time especially among the older cohorts. For less skilled 
individuals, the ratio between immigrants and natives is closer to 10% and rises less over time, 
though some modest rises can be observed among the youngest cohorts in the latest time period. 
The bottom part of the table reports the ratio of the immigrant-native share for university 
graduates to that for high school workers. A value of one implies that immigrants are equally 
represented among skilled and less skilled individuals. Almost all of these ratios are above one, 
implying that immigrants are on average more educated than natives. These ratios tend to 
increase across subsequent cohorts. For example among those aged 41-45 in 1975, those born in 
1930-1934, this ratio is around 1.4. Thirty years later, this ratio is 2.8. The skill ratio tends to fall 
among the youngest cohorts from 2000 onward.  
Information on the estimated returns to education by immigrant status and the native-
migrant wage premia for each age-time cell are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively along with 
their standard errors. Observations with higher standard errors will receive less weight in the 
regressions that follow. Consistent with Card and Lemieux (2001), reading down any column in 
Table 3, the relative returns to a university degree grew from the late 1970s onward. Younger 
graduate cohorts benefited relatively more until the mid 1990s. Since then the differential gain 
across age cohorts is less obvious. Reading across the rows, it is also apparent that the age profile 
of the university wage premium has become much flatter over time, while shifting up, i.e. 
ensuring a higher premium to all graduates over the same period. The results for immigrants are 
similar but much less precisely estimated because of the smaller sample sizes. Similarly, it is 
difficult to detect any clear trends in the native wage premia by education in Table 4, especially 
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among the most educated. The age-wage profiles for high school workers, suggest that in the 
1970s there were large pay advantages for home born workers relative to similar qualified 
immigrants among older cohorts, though these premia appear to have fallen over time.  
 
5. Results 
We next estimate model (4) formally. The first step is to estimate equation (8) from which we can 
recover an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives. Since little is 
known about the magnitude of this parameter in the UK, we present a number of different 
specifications to examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative specifications. Table 5 
gives these estimates. Since the dependent variable, the native-immigrant wage differential, is 
based on regressions using individual data for each cell, we use the reciprocal of the square of the 
standard error on these estimated returns as weights and run minimum distance weighted least 
squares regressions.  
Column (1) reports the basic specification. The model controls for additive age, time and 
education dummies. The reported coefficient gives the estimate of the coefficient on the supply of 
natives relative to immigrants in the relative wage equation, the negative of the reciprocal of the 
elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives (σI). Under the assumption of perfect 
substitutability, the wage gap in each cell should be constant, but the estimates suggest that the 
overall native-immigrant wage differential is lower when, ceteris paribus, immigration is lower. 
The estimated coefficient is -0.156 and significant at conventional levels, implying an elasticity 
of substitution between immigrants and natives of around 6.3. Column (2) interacts the supply 
term with the dummy for high school education, allowing for the possibility that elasticity of 
substitution could vary by education. Although the point estimates differ across education groups, 
the hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same cannot be rejected at usual significance 
levels (the difference being 0.053, with a standard error of 0.100). 
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To show that these results are not driven by outliers, in Figure 2 we plot the log native-
immigrant wage (on the vertical axis) against the log native-immigrant supply (on the horizontal  
axis) by age, time and education cells. The values are obtained as residuals from regressions of 
the relevant variables on additive time, age and education dummies i.e. are the residuals from the 
regression of the first column in Table 5. Each circle represents an observation in the data, with 
larger circles implying greater weight. The line in the figure is the estimated regression line. One 
can clearly see that regression results are not driven by outliers and that a similar relationship 
between wages and supply appears to hold for both those with high school and those with 
university education.  
One might wonder whether there any particular age-education-year observations which 
tend to be on the right or left of Figure 2.  As a test, we re-estimate the model with less restrictive 
assumptions on the education-age-year dummies. Accordingly column (3) reports an estimate of 
model (4) where we include controls for all pair-wise interactions between the age, education and 
time dummies. This is a very saturated model and identification of the elasticity of substitution is 
only based on the interaction of age, time and education. Even in this highly saturated model, the 
negative effect of relative supply remains. The point estimate is -0.237 and significant at the 10% 
level.  
We next undertake further robustness checks, restricting the definition of immigrants in 
the wage cells to be, respectively, recent immigrants (those who arrived in the last five years) and 
adult immigrants (those who arrived as adults after the age at which most of them would have 
finished their education which we take to be 21 for both high school workers and university 
graduates).11 Using recent immigrants, column(4) shows that the estimated coefficient on the 
supply term is -0.361, implying a low degree of substitution between natives and recent 
immigrants, of less than 3. This is intuitive, since it suggests that  recent immigrants largely bear 
                                                 
11 Note we still use all immigrants (whether recent or old, or whether they came to the country as children or adults) 
to compute supply. This is because information on time since migration is not available in the LFS throughout the 
period of observation. Care should therefore be used when interpreting these coefficients. 
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the cost of changes in the stock of immigrants. In column (5) we report results for immigrants 
who arrived as adults. It appears that the wages of these workers are marginally more sensitive to 
changes in the stock of immigrants, though the coefficient is not significantly different from that 
in column (1). Finally the estimate in column (6) of the table is based on cells categorised by the 
interaction of time, education and potential experience rather than age. The results are essentially 
unchanged, with a coefficient of -0.145 and an implied elasticity of substitution between 
immigrant and native workers in the order of 6.9 
Having ascertained that the estimate of the elasticity of substitution between immigrant 
and natives is broadly robust we now estimate the other parameters of the model, namely the 
elasticity of substitution between different age and education groups. We replicate the results 
from column (1) of Table 5 in the first column of Table 6. The second column reports a new 
estimate of this coefficient together with an estimate of the coefficient on the effect of changes in 
the relative supply of skills by age and time on the returns to university education (equation(9)). 
The estimate of -1/σI remains similar to the one in column (1). The estimated elasticity between 
immigrants and native-born falls to around 5 while the estimated coefficient on age-specific 
relative labour supply, -1/σA, is -0.108 and statistically significant. This implies an elasticity of 
substitution across workers of different ages (σA) of around 10, rather larger than the estimates in 
the order of 4.5 found for Britain by Card and Lemieux (2001). Our different sample periods, 
sample size, differences in the data used to estimate labour supply, different weights given to 
immigrant and native workers and different definitions of education are all likely to explain these 
differences. Lastly in column (3) we report new estimates of the effects of the share of natives to 
immigrants, the relative supply of university workers by age alongside the estimate of the overall 
relative supply of university workers based on equation(11). The estimated coefficient on the 
linear time trend used to approximate SBTC is 0.013, so that the graduate to high school wage 
gap has grown by around 1.3% a year over the sample period. The data imply an estimated 
coefficient on the relative supply of university to high school workers of about -0.172, implying 
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an elasticity of substitution between university and high school workers, σE, of around 5.8. Again 
this is larger than the estimate of 2.5 found by Card and Lemieux. The estimate of the elasticity of 
substitution between native born and immigrants again remains virtually unchanged. 
The estimates so far use population as a measure of labour supply because we believe that 
this is a 'more exogenous' source of variation in supply than the employment or hours measures 
often used. One can think of our estimates as a ‘reduced-form’. But, there is a danger that our 
estimates reflect not just labour demand elasticities but also labour supply elasticities. In order to 
present results comparable to the ones generally produced and in order to check for the potential 
effect of changes in labour supply on employment, we repeat the exercise using hours of work or 
employment as alternative measures of supply and instrument this with the population in each 
cell. Table 7 reports two stage least squares results of the regression using hours worked.12 For 
the first stage, we find an elasticity of hours relative to the labour supply (at all levels of 
aggregation) in the order of one, suggesting an inelastic labour supply curve. Not surprisingly 
then, the results based on 2SLS are similar to the estimates in Table 6. 
 
6. Simulating the Effects of Immigration on Relative Wages 
In this section we use our results to simulate the effect of changes in the stock and skill mix of 
immigrants on various aspects of the wage distribution. To keep things simple we look at only 
two summary measures of the wage distribution - the return to education among natives and the 
overall native-migrant wage differential. We derive the explicit expressions for the effect of 
migration on the wage structure in the Technical Appendix. 
 In our simulations we consider four cases. First, a 10% rise in the immigrant share in each 
age-education cell i.e. a skill-neutral change. Because immigrants are about 10% of employment 
this is roughly equivalent to a 1 percentage point rise in the share of immigrants in the economy 
as a whole. Secondly, skill-biased changes to the immigrant mix, with a 20% rise in the number 
                                                 
12  The estimates using employment are similar and are available from the authors on request. 
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of skilled immigrants and no change in the number of unskilled immigrants. Thirdly, a 20% rise 
in the number of less skilled immigrants and no change in the number of skilled immigrants. 
Finally we take the actual change over the period 1975-2005 in the immigrant share relative to 
the native share. For our simulations we use the estimates in the final column of Table 6. 
 The results are shown in Table 8. The first row shows that a 10% rise in the immigrant 
share in all cells is predicted to lead to a 2.0% rise in the native-migrant wage differential. This is 
what one would expect from a direct reading of the estimates in the final column of Table 6. But 
the predicted impact on the return to education among natives is zero – this is what one might 
expect from the skill-neutral nature of the change. However the second and third rows also show 
that this happens when there is skill bias in the immigrant flows. If all immigrants are skilled the 
native-migrant wage differential rises (but only slightly), because of the composition effect – 
immigrants are becoming more skilled relative to natives. But there is very little effect on the 
return to education among natives. The explanation is that the imperfect substitutability between 
natives and immigrants ameliorates the impact on natives. 
 This can most easily be understood using a simpler model than the one we have used in 
which the age dimension is removed from the technology. One can show (see Technical 
Appendix) that in this case the change in the return to education among natives in response to a 
change in the supply of migrants will be given by:  
( ) ( )[ ]tMtM
IE
N
t
N
t MdsMds
W
W
d 2211
2
1 lnln11ln −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= σσ                                (12) 
where sMe is the share of the wage bill accruing to immigrants in education cell e. The important 
point is that the change in returns is likely to be very small and will be smaller the lower the 
degree of substitution among natives and immigrants. It will be small for a number of reasons. 
First the term involving the elasticity of substitutions is likely to be small and even ‘perverse’ in 
sign given our estimates. Secondly the impact of migration will only have an effect to the extent 
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that there is a change in the migrants’ skill mix or differences in the wage bill share in the two 
education groups.  
One implication of this is that it is not at all surprising that researchers have failed to 
detect any significant effect of immigrants on native outcomes. However this failure does not 
mean that there are no economic effects, rather that the effects on groups other than the 
immigrants themselves are very small. One can see this also from the fourth column of Table 8 
that simulates the effect of the actual changes in immigration over the period 1975-2005 relative 
to the case where the immigrant share in each cell remained constant. The prediction is that the 
changes have raised the native-migrant wage differential by 0.055 and raised the return to 
education by 0.004. This is tiny relative to the 0.15 actual changes over this period. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Based on a stylised model of labour demand that allows native-born workers and immigrants to 
be imperfect substitutes in production we show how one can, under appropriate identification 
assumptions, estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives. Given this 
framework, the rise in immigration experienced in Britain over the past decades does appear to 
have changed the wage structure. It seems that immigration depresses the earnings of immigrants 
relative to the native-born, suggesting imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants in 
production. When combined with Card and Lemieux's (2001) conclusions (that we confirm even 
after the addition of later data) that the return to university education is sensitive to the relative 
supply of university graduates, this implies that when immigration has a different skill mix from 
the native population this will affect returns to education among natives. Because immigrants are 
better-educated than natives, immigration will have reduced the return to education among both 
migrants and natives. But, because of the imperfect substitutability between natives and 
immigrants and the fact that the immigrant share is still quite low, then the size of this effect will 
be small, so it is not surprising that existing studies have failed to find a significant effect on the 
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labour market outcomes of natives. Our conclusions suggest that the main impact of increased 
immigration in the UK is on the outcomes for immigrants who are already here.  
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Data appendix 
Definition of education. 
We classify the sample into two education categories, university and high school equivalents, 
similarly to Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card and Lemieux (2001). We define university 
workers as those who left full time education at age 21 or later and high school workers as those 
who left full time education between age 17 and 20. Using age left full-time education to define 
levels of schooling is not standard practice in Britain so our use of it here needs some 
justification.13  Both the LFS and GHS do not always record the qualifications of immigrants 
accurately. This is important not just for our purposes but also for more general debates about the 
skills of immigrants to the UK.  
A large proportion of immigrants in both the LFS and the GHS report holding 'other 
qualifications'. Table A1 based on LFS data from 2000-2005 shows that while 6.3% of natives 
report holding ‘other qualifications’, 28.8% of immigrants do so. The following two columns of 
Table A1 show that the problem is much worse for immigrants who arrived in the UK after the 
age at which they left full-time education with 41.8% of this group reporting they hold ‘other’ 
qualifications compared to 6.0% of immigrants who arrived in the UK before completing full-
time education. The reason for this problem is not entirely clear but there are two likely causes. 
First, the qualifications listed in the LFS are British qualifications that do not translate directly 
into foreign equivalents and, secondly, it appears that the Office for National Statistics have 
deliberately coded all foreign qualifications into the ‘other’ category.  
Researchers generally use one of two approaches to deal with the problem caused by 
those reporting ‘other qualifications’ – they either code them as missing or as a low level of 
qualifications (on the grounds that every conceivable high qualification is covered elsewhere in 
the classification). For natives it is likely that results are not very sensitive to this decision rule. 
But, for immigrants, it is more of a problem. To code the ‘other’ group as missing is only valid if 
                                                 
13 Bell (1997) in his analysis of immigration to the UK uses a similar definition of skills. 
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they are ‘missing at random’ and to assume they have low qualifications is also problematic. We 
can get another idea of the extent of this problem by looking at Table A2 which reports, for each 
level of education, the percentage reporting leaving full-time education at or before the age of 16, 
17-20 inclusive and 21 or later. The three panels report this information for natives, immigrants 
who arrived in the UK before completing full-time education and for those who arrived after. For 
natives 93% of those in the ‘other’ category left education by the age of 16 and only 1% after the 
age of 21. For immigrants who completed full-time education in the UK the figures are 55% and 
20% and for immigrants who completed full-time education outside the UK 20% of the ‘other’ 
category completed education by the age of 16 and 38% after the age of 21. This suggests that 
immigrants in the ‘other category’ are quite well-educated – indeed they seem from Table A2 to 
be most similar to those with a degree. 
Further information on this point comes from exploiting the panel element of the LFS. 
Individuals are in the LFS for 5 quarters and are asked the education question in each quarter so it 
is possible that they are coded as ‘other’ in one quarter and something else in another. Table A3 
shows the distribution of qualifications among this group. The sample here excludes all who 
report being in full-time education or working towards a qualification. One should note that this 
group may be dominated by measurement error and is quite small in size. However, 11% of 
immigrants in this group report having a degree compared to 0.5% of natives, again suggesting 
the immigrants in the ‘other’ group are much better-qualified than the natives. 
Table A4 reports the distribution of highest qualification from the 2001 Census (when 
such a question was asked for the first time). This question is similar to the LFS question, being 
very ‘UK-centric’. But the census does not have a markedly bigger problem with immigrants in 
the ‘other’ category or with missing information. And the census suggests a much larger 
proportion of immigrants than natives have a university degree.  
In short, it is difficult to assign immigrants to the high and low qualification group using 
reported levels of qualification. Moreover the highest educational categories are not the same in 
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the GHS and LFS which again hinders the matching process across the two data sets. In order to 
circumvent these problems we use instead the variable “age left full time education”, which is 
defined consistently across the two data sets.14  
 
Wages 
In order to compute wages by cell we use information on weekly earnings of male full time 
employees and we drop individuals with weekly earnings below £50 and above £2000. For the 
regressions we group individuals into five year and five year-age cells. We use all the available 
data from the GHS spanning between 1973 and 2005.15  
To derive measures of the returns to education by immigrant status, age and time we run 
separate regressions of the log weekly wages of every individual in each cell (for example native 
born workers, born in 1945-1949 observed in 1973-1977) on a dummy for university education, a 
linear age term (from 26-32), year dummies (from 1973 to 1977), and a London dummy. We run 
this regression only for those with exactly university or high school education (as defined above).  
We use a similar procedure to estimate native wage premia for each age-time-education status 
cell. Table 3 provides information on returns to education for natives while Table 4 provides 
wages of native-born relative to immigrants by skill. 
 
 
Supply 
In order to compute labour supply for each cell, we use the estimated number of individuals in the 
population falling in each age/education/migrant status category. We measure the supply of 
university graduates as the number of individuals in the sample period that left full time 
education at age 21 or later. To compute the supply of high school equivalents we combine the 
number of individuals who left full time education between the ages of 17 and 20 together with 
                                                 
14 Despite this, the GHS shows a slowdown in educational attainment based on years of education after 1998 when 
the questions ascertaining years of education changed from “how old were you when you finished your course” to 
“how old were you when you finished your continuous full-time education”.  
15  There was no GHS from April 1997 to March 1998 and from April 1999 to March 2000. 
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the number of individuals who left full time education at age 16 or under. We weight this second 
quantity by the average (over all time periods) of the relative wage of individuals with less than 
high school relative to those with exactly high school in each age-nativity group, similarly to 
Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card and Lemieux (2001). The wage measure differential 
conditions on a dummy for London. We use all the available data from the LFS spanning 
between 1977 and (the first quarter of) 2006. 16 We present data on the relative supply of natives 
and immigrants by skill and on the ratio of the two in Table 2.  
 
Technical appendix 
The effect of immigration on the wage structure. 
Denote the hypothetical changes in the numbers of immigrant in each education-age cell we are 
considering by ( )ln ead M . From (4) and ignoring the time subscript we have for natives: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1ln ln ln lnNea e ea
E E A A I
d W d Y d L d Lσ σ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  
And for immigrants that:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1ln ln ln ln lnMea e ea ea
E E A A I I
d W d Y d L d L d Mσ σ σ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  
This is the same as for natives but with a final direct impact on the supplies. The components of 
these two equations can be computed in the following sequential way: 
( ) ( ) ( )ln ln lnM Mea eaea ea ea eaN M
ea ea ea ea
Md L d M s d M
N M
δ
δ δ
β
β β= =+  
Where seaM can be shown to be the wage bill share of immigrants in the ea education-age cell. We 
also have that: 
                                                 
16 The LFS is available from 1977 to the last quarter of 2005 with the exception of years 1978, 1980 and 1982. We 
use all the available waves in each 5-year interval to compute supply. For example, to compute supply in 1975 we 
use data from 1977 only. For the year 1980 we use data from 1979 and 1981. 
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Where eas  can be shown to be the wage bill share of age-group a in education cell e. And finally 
that:  
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Where se can be shown to be the wage bill share of education cell e. We use the observed wage 
bill shares and estimated elasticities of substitution to compute the changes in wages for each cell 
in response to different hypothetical changes in the number and composition of immigrants. 
 Because we are interested only in summary statistics we need to weight these cell-specific 
changes by the employment shares to get the overall changes. When we consider the native 
immigrant-wage differential there is an additional composition effect from the change in the skill 
mix of immigrants and not just from changes in the wage structure. 
 
Equation (12) 
Assuming there is no intermediate age-level in the production function, from the equations above 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1ln ln ln lnNe e e
E I
d W d Y d L d Lσ σ= − +   
where ( ) ( )ln lnMe e ed L s d M=  and again Mes  is the wage bill share of immigrants among the 
relevant education group. Taking differences across skills groups of this last equation, this leads 
to equation (12) in the text. 
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Figure 1. Immigrant Share in Male Population of Working Age  
 
 
Source: Computations from LFS various years as described in the text.  
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Figure 2. Native-Migrant Wage Premia and Relative Supply by Age, Time and Education 
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The graphs give the log native-migrant wage premia on the vertical axis on the log native-migrant labour supply on 
the horizontal axis. Both series are obtained as residuals from a regression on additive age, time and education 
dummies. The line in the figures refers to estimated GLS line. The top graph refers to high school workers while the 
bottom graph side panel refers to university workers. 
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Table 1. Male Immigrants and Native-Born Men in Britain 
 
 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Share of immigrants     
 Total 0.081 0.088 0.094 0.119 
      
 University 0.128 0.151 0.181 0.201 
 High School or less 0.078 0.078 0.076 0.093 
      
Share of university graduates     
 Native-born  0.060 0.122 0.154 0.216 
 Immigrants  0.099 0.227 0.329 0.404 
     
Returns to native-born workers     
 University 0.089 0.100  0.029 0.088   
 High School  0.243 0.237 0.147 0.129 
     
Returns to university education     
  Native-born 0.123 0.122 0.164 0.244 
  Immigrants 0.257 0.243 0.296 0.299 
Notes.  Computations are based on LFS and GHS data as described in the Data Appendix. Returns to education are 
computed as the regression coefficient of log weekly wages on a dummy for university education, conditional on a 
quadratic in age and a dummy for London. The returns to native-born are computed as the regression coefficient of 
log weekly wages on a dummy for university education, conditional on a quadratic in age and a dummy for London. 
Regressions only include those with a university degree or a high school degree (as defined in the text).  
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Table 2: Immigrant-native-born population ratio by Age, Time and Education 
 
 Age 
  26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 
University        
1973-1977 0.151 0.154 0.214 0.141 0.100 0.088 0.116 
1978-1982 0.185 0.178 0.224 0.243 0.201 0.206 0.168 
1983-1987 0.189 0.182 0.162 0.193 0.202 0.185 0.125 
1988-1992 0.203 0.227 0.188 0.176 0.189 0.241 0.246 
1993-1997 0.227 0.257 0.252 0.199 0.156 0.209 0.237 
1998-2002 0.227 0.274 0.279 0.243 0.198 0.147 0.185 
2003-2005 0.276 0.329 0.309 0.272 0.224 0.168 0.139 
        
High school        
1973-1977 0.061 0.083 0.099 0.092 0.106 0.081 0.080 
1978-1982 0.080 0.064 0.088 0.100 0.097 0.106 0.101 
1983-1987 0.076 0.079 0.067 0.082 0.097 0.098 0.108 
1988-1992 0.066 0.088 0.096 0.072 0.090 0.111 0.105 
1993-1997 0.059 0.074 0.094 0.091 0.068 0.088 0.114 
1998-2002 0.083 0.072 0.091 0.098 0.095 0.072 0.093 
2003-2005 0.138 0.111 0.088 0.097 0.108 0.108 0.078 
        
Ratio        
1973-1977 2.495 1.850 2.156 1.534 0.937 1.637 1.427 
1978-1982 2.323 2.772 2.522 2.428 2.062 2.234 1.653 
1983-1987 2.493 2.298 2.400 2.344 2.090 2.086 1.143 
1988-1992 3.084 2.558 1.953 2.443 2.098 2.369 2.333 
1993-1997 3.875 3.440 2.672 2.182 2.273 2.690 2.065 
1998-2002 2.722 3.803 3.034 2.483 2.090 2.594 1.985 
2003-2005 1.996 2.973 3.509 2.800 2.074 2.386 1.781 
Notes. The table reports the ratio between immigrants and natives in the working age population by age, time and 
education. The top part of the table refers to those with a University degree, the middle part of the table to those with 
completed High school . Source LFS. 
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Table 3: Returns to University/High School by Age, Year and Immigrant Status 
 
 Age 
 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 
UK born        
1973-1977 0.091 0.120 0.118 0.124 0.116 0.138 0.171 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.037) (0.042) (0.048) (0.053) (0.070) 
1978-1982 0.054 0.099 0.087 0.152 0.180 0.137 0.155 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.030) (0.035) (0.047) (0.054) (0.066) 
1983-1987 0.074 0.087 0.156 0.141 0.169 0.051 0.177 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.039) (0.051) (0.061) (0.090) 
1988-1992 0.149 0.177 0.122 0.109 0.075 0.281 0.133 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.047) (0.054) (0.080) 
1993-1997 0.169 0.161 0.173 0.135 0.089 0.209 0.151 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.054) (0.079) 
1998-2002 0.192 0.271 0.243 0.260 0.276 0.240 0.180 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) (0.043) (0.052) (0.086) 
2003-2005 0.221 0.285 0.276 0.251 0.275 0.203 0.303 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.044) (0.057) (0.054) (0.059) (0.077) 
Foreign 
born 
       
1973-1977 0.036 0.175 0.123 0.162 0.455 0.508 0.657 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.083) (0.092) (0.104) (0.121) (0.148) 
1978-1982 0.056 0.145 0.181 0.079 0.187 0.214 0.409 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.072) (0.077) (0.103) (0.142) (0.162) 
1983-1987 0.190 0.102 0.345 0.173 0.421 0.149 0.588 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.082) (0.097) (0.152) (0.165) (0.185) 
1988-1992 0.132 0.153 0.162 0.322 0.438 0.203 0.560 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.085) (0.107) (0.139) (0.126) (0.178) 
1993-1997 0.034 0.148 0.239 0.528 0.280 0.572 -0.056 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.097) (0.094) (0.131) (0.144) (0.223) 
1998-2002 0.530 0.417 0.454 0.282 0.328 0.612 0.101 
 (0.086) (0.088) (0.101) (0.113) (0.135) (0.177) (0.213) 
2003-2005 0.157 0.338 0.331 0.354 0.175 0.383 0.428 
 (0.089) (0.094) (0.108) (0.127) (0.135) (0.161) (0.259) 
Notes. Estimated returns to education for immigrants and natives by age and time. Standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients in brackets. See text for details. Source: GHS.  
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Table 4: Estimated Relative Returns to Native Born by Age, Year and Education 
 Age 
 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 
University        
1973-1977 0.107 0.108 0.234 0.203 -0.007 0.066 0.010 
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.073) (0.075) (0.094) (0.114) (0.136) 
1978-1982 0.183 0.075 0.195 0.222 0.226 0.148 0.069 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.059) (0.065) (0.090) (0.114) (0.149) 
1983-1987 0.025 0.089 0.147 0.181 0.070 0.237 -0.047 
 (0.054) (0.049) (0.060) (0.073) (0.136) (0.140) (0.156) 
1988-1992 0.145 0.203 0.070 0.181 0.026 0.231 -0.137 
 (0.054) (0.058) (0.060) (0.078) (0.108) (0.103) (0.143) 
1993-1997 0.138 0.082 0.013 -0.105 -0.084 -0.004 0.690 
 (0.066) (0.053) (0.065) (0.066) (0.094) (0.106) (0.180) 
1998-2002 -0.080 0.090 0.096 0.060 0.073 -0.103 0.132 
 (0.062) (0.058) (0.065) (0.073) (0.104) (0.113) (0.138) 
2003-2005 0.144 0.072 0.050 -0.022 0.223 0.053 0.214 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.083) (0.100) (0.095) (0.119) (0.176) 
High 
School 
       
1973-1977 0.052 0.166 0.239 0.237 0.334 0.447 0.496 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.059) (0.073) (0.071) (0.070) (0.099) 
1978-1982 0.184 0.121 0.289 0.149 0.233 0.225 0.323 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.056) (0.059) (0.073) (0.108) (0.091) 
1983-1987 0.141 0.104 0.336 0.214 0.323 0.335 0.364 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) (0.079) (0.087) (0.123) (0.141) 
1988-1992 0.128 0.179 0.110 0.394 0.389 0.153 0.290 
 (0.058) (0.063) (0.067) (0.085) (0.102) (0.095) (0.141) 
1993-1997 0.002 0.069 0.078 0.288 0.107 0.359 0.483 
 (0.063) (0.074) (0.080) (0.077) (0.105) (0.117) (0.177) 
1998-2002 0.258 0.229 0.307 0.082 0.124 0.270 0.054 
 (0.070) (0.075) (0.086) (0.098) (0.102) (0.149) (0.190) 
2003-2005 0.080 0.124  0.105 0.081 0.123 0.232 0.340 
 (0.073) (0.179) (0.086) (0.099) (0.124) (0.133) (0.217) 
Notes. Estimated wage differential between natives and immigrants by age and time. Standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients in brackets. See text for details. Source: GHS. 
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Table 5. Estimated Elasticities of Substitution by immigrant status (step 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Basic 
specification
Different 
σI  by 
education
Saturated 
model 
Recent 
immigrants 
only 
Adult 
immigrants 
only 
Controls for 
experience
       
log supply -0.156** -0.178** -0.237* -0.361** -0.206** -0.145** 
 (0.053) (0.068) (0.122) (0.121) (0.074) (0.052) 
 0.053     log supply * high school 
 (0.100)     
       
Education dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Education *Age   Yes    
Education * Time    Yes    
Time * Age    Yes    
Experience dummies      Yes 
Notes: The table reports the reciprocal of the negative of the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and 
natives (-1/σI) (equation 8 in the text). The dependent variable is the native-migrant log wage differential by 
education, time and age. The independent variable is the log native-migrant relative supply of by education, time and 
age. Column (1) includes all immigrants and natives and conditions on additive education, age and time dummies. 
Column (2) allows for the coefficient on relative supply to vary by education. Column (3) uses the same specification 
as in column (1) but additionally controls for each pairwise interaction between education, age and time dummies. 
Column (4) uses the same specification as in column (1) but only restricts to recent immigrants, defined as those who 
arrived in the country in the last five years. Column (5) only restricts to adult immigrants, defined as those who 
arrived in the country after the age they could have theoretically completed their highest qualification achieved. 
Column (6) calculates the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives based on cells defined by the 
interaction of education, time and potential experience (instead of age). Sample size = 98. All regressions weighted 
by inverse of estimated variance of dependent variable. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Source 
GHS and LFS. See text for details.  
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Table 6. Estimated Elasticities of Substitution by Immigrant status, Age and Education 
Variable  Dependent variable: log relative wages 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Parameter Native/ 
Immigrant 
University/ 
High School 
(by age) 
University/ 
High School 
(aggregate) 
Independent variable: log 
relative supply 
 (Step 1) (Step 2) (Step 3) 
     
Native-immigrant  (-1/σI) -0.156** -0.199** -0.198** 
by age and education  (0.053) (0.065) (0.054) 
     
(-1/σA)  -0.108** -0.101** University-High school  
by age   (0.047) (0.048) 
     
University-High school  (-1/σE)   -0.172** 
(aggregate)    (0.054) 
     
Time trend S.B.T.C. `  0.013** 
    (0.003) 
     
Education dummies  Yes   
Time dummies  Yes Yes  
Age dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Immigrant dummy   Yes Yes 
Notes. The Table reports OLS estimates of equations (8), (9) and (10) in the text. The regression in column (1) is the 
same as reported in Table 5, column (1). See also notes to table 5. 
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Table 7. Elasticities of Substitution by Education, Age and Education (IV estimates) 
   Dependent  Variable 
 1st Stage  2nd Stage 
 Log employment  Log wages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Native/ 
Immigrant 
University/ 
High School 
(by age) 
University/ 
High School 
(aggregate) 
 Native/ 
Immigrant 
University/ 
High School 
(by age) 
University/ 
High School 
(aggregate) 
Independent variable: log 
relative supply 
    (Step 1) (Step 2) (Step 3) 
        
Native-immigrant  0.938**    -0.172** -0.209** -0.204** 
by age and education (0.081)    (0.059) (0.043) (0.071) 
        
 1.185**    -0.099** -0.095** University-High school  
by age  (0.058)    (0.043) (0.44) 
        
University-High school    1.186**      -0.086** 
(aggregate)   (0.056)    (0.028) 
        
Time trend     `  0.010** 
       (0.002) 
        
Education dummies Yes    Yes   
Time dummies Yes Yes   Yes Yes  
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Immigrant dummy  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
        
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Notes. The Table reports 2SLS estimates of equations (8), (9) and (10) in the text where employment is instrumented by population. Columns (1) to (3) reports the first stage 
estimates. Column (4) to (6) report the 2SLS estimates. See also notes to table 6. 
 36
Table 8. Simulations of the Impact of Immigration on Relative Wages 
 Log Native-Migrant 
Wage Differential 
Log Skilled-Unskilled 
Wage Differential  
(Natives Only) 
10% rise in all immigrants 0.023 0 
   
20% rise in skilled immigrants, 
No change in unskilled immigrants 
0.009 0.001 
   
20% rise in unskilled immigrants, 
No change in skilled immigrants 
0.037 -0.001 
   
Actual change in immigrants relative to 
natives 
0.055 0.004 
Notes. These simulations are based on actual wage bill shares in 2005, and the estimates of the elasticities of 
substitution from the final column of Table 6. 
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Table A1. Highest Qualification of Natives and immigrants, (LFS Data, 2000-2005) 
Highest qualification Natives Migrants Migrants  Migrants  
  All Left FT Education 
before UK arrival 
Left FT 
Education after 
UK arrival 
     
Degree or equivalent 14.3 18.3 12.8 28.0 
Higher education 9.0 7.7 6.4 10.1 
GCE A-level or 
equivalent 
23.4 13.4 10.0 19.3 
GCSE/CSE or equivalent 28.7 12.7 6.4 23.9 
Other qualification 6.3 28.8 41.8 6.0 
No qualification 17.5 18.4 22.0 12.0 
Missing 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Notes. Source: LFS 2000-2005. Sample is individuals aged 16-64 not in full-time education. 
 
Table A2. Highest Qualification and Age Left Full-Time Education of Natives and 
immigrants, (LFS Data, 2000-2005) 
  Age lest education  
Highest qualification 16 or earlier 17/20 inclusive 21 or later 
 
Migrants – Left FT Education before UK arrival 
Degree or equivalent 3.9 23.3 72.9 
Higher education 18.3 54.2 27.5 
GCE A-level or equivalent 33.3 50.7 16.0 
GCSE/CSE or equivalent 36.0 49.7 14.3 
Other qualification 20.0 41.7 38.2 
No qualification 80.3 17.7 2.0 
Missing 58.3 33.4 8.3 
 
Migrants – Left FT Education after UK arrival 
Degree or equivalent 3.3 12.9 83.8 
Higher education 19.1 44.6 36.2 
GCE A-level or equivalent 35.9 54.3 9.8 
GCSE/CSE or equivalent 54.0 43.6 2.4 
Other qualification 55.4 22.7 21.9 
No qualification 87.7 11.3 1.0 
Missing 61.2 33.1 5.7 
 
Natives 
Degree or equivalent 10.0 17.6 72.4 
Higher education 36.5 42.7 20.9 
GCE A-level or equivalent 59.6 37.8 2.6 
GCSE/CSE or equivalent 71.6 28.1 0.4 
Other qualification 93.5 5.8 0.7 
No qualification 97.2 2.7 0.1 
Missing 80.6 17.3 2.2 
Notes. See notes to Table A1.
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Table A3. Highest Qualification of Natives and immigrants who report ‘Other’ 
Qualifications, (LFS Data, 2000-2005) 
Highest qualification Natives Migrants Migrants  Migrants  
  All Left FT 
Education before 
UK arrival 
Left FT 
Education after 
UK arrival 
     
Degree or equivalent 0.9 11.0 11.5 8.2 
Higher education 2.4 6.9 7.5 4.0 
GCE A-level or equivalent 32.1 34.9 36.3 27.4 
GCSE/CSE or equivalent 39.8 22.3 19.1 40.2 
Other qualification 23.5 23.4 24.1 19.8 
Missing 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.3 
Notes. Sample includes those who report ‘other qualification’ in one quarter and something else in another and 
excludes those that report being in full-time education or working towards a qualification in any quarter. See also 
notes to Table A1. 
 
 
Table A4. Highest Qualification of Natives and Immigrants: Census, 2001 
Highest qualification Natives Migrants 
  All 
   
Degree or equivalent 19.5 34.9 
Higher education 7.1 8.3 
GCE A-level or equivalent 39.2 21.8 
GCSE/CSE or equivalent 6.1 5.2 
Other qualification 25.1 24.3 
Missing 3.1 5.4 
Source: 2001 Census Sample of Anonymized Records (SARS). Sample is those aged 16-60 inclusive who are not in 
full-time education and whose country of birth is not missing.  
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